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 Some peace operations are seen as ‘successful’ and others as ‘unsuc-
cessful’, often with little discussion of the yardsticks used for measur-
ing such success or failure. While some operations are relatively easy to 
put into boxes labelled ‘success’ and ‘failure’, most are not. Under-
standing what constitutes success and failure in peace operations is 
necessary for building rigorous scholarly knowledge about internation-
al interventions and their effects, and for making sound policy deci-
sions. Despite the growth in the study of peace operations, on UN 
peacekeeping in particular, one important aspect has been under-
researched: how to judge whether a peace operation has been success-
ful or not. Evaluation studies tend to focus on the sources of success, at 
the expense of the criteria employed in assessing success. Researchers 
generally draw on their personal predispositions and ideas as to what 
success means, and then focus on the various factors that contribute to 
it. However, analytically speaking, determining what is meant by suc-
cess must be the first step.  
This background paper examines how the academic literature has 
approached the question of success in peace operations. Here it should 
be noted that many theoretical and methodological issues have not 
been settled, nor does this contribution seek to resolve them. The aim 
here is to shed light on the issue, and indicate where choices need to be 
made for research into success to be rigorous. The first section exam-
ines differences between the way that scholarly and practitioner anal-
yses approach this question. The section that follows looks at how the 
academic literature has approached the definition of success and where 
some of the fault-lines lie. In the conclusion I outline a number of 
methodological decisions that need to be made when conducting re-
search on success.    
How do scholarly and practitioner analyses of success in 
peace operations differ? 
Since the mid-1990s, when academic research on peace operations 
became more systematic, there have been calls for uniting theory and 
practice.1 Many scholars are concerned with the possible contributions 
their work can make to policy. There has been a growth in research that 
encourages ‘a more collaborative approach in which agreed definitions 
emerge that serve common goals of more-peaceful societies’.2 However, 
despite an often congruent comprehension of overall goals, scholarly 
and practitioner analyses of success in peace operations tend to differ 
on two counts.  
                                                          
1  See for example, A.B. Fetherston (1994) Towards a Theory on United Nations 
Peacekeeping. New York: Palgrave.  
2  Daniel Druckman and Paul Stern (1999) Perspectives on Evaluating Peacekeeping 
Missions. The International Journal of Peace Studies 4(1), available at 
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol4_1/druckman.htm. 
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First, academic research tends to focus on generalizable criteria, 
whereas practitioners favour criteria unique to specific missions. This is 
not surprising. Many scholars look for comparative aspects in order to 
contribute to their primary academic interest: theory building. By con-
trast, policy-makers take their starting point in practice and trying to 
improve missions; their concern is with what works and what does not 
in a specific operation and a specific context. That being said, with the 
proliferation of evaluation departments in many international organi-
zations, also practitioners have started moving towards comparative 
analyses and generalizable aspects. Here they have focused particular-
ly on factors/sources of success, examining success along one chosen 
dimension (for example, how successful missions are in promoting 
security sector reform). In this way, practitioners attempt to avoid some 
of the methodological issues around generalization that have dominat-
ed much of the scholarly debate.  
The second distinction between scholarly analyses and those of 
practitioners is the difference in focus. Scholars usually favour a mac-
ro-approach to studying success, focusing on the broader political 
goals and longer-term consequences. Practitioners, by contrast, tend to 
focus on mandate implementation, whether in whole or in part. Such 
assessments are used as lessons learned, for fine-tuning and adjusting 
the operation – usually with a fairly short-term focus. Policy-makers 
rarely question the overall idea of peace operations or the theory of 
change entailed. It is assumed that achieving short-term goals is a pre-
condition for longer-term success. For example, the success categoriza-
tion developed by NATO differentiates between success on the strategic 
and on the operational/tactical levels, and links the fulfilment of stra-
tegic goals to successful implementation of operational/tactical ones.3 
Practitioners concentrate on factors under their control, subsuming 
these under operational goals. Scholars, however, focus primarily on 
broader benchmarks of success, such as resolution of a conflict or re-
duction of human suffering. For that reason, they are more inclined to 
include in their analyses factors beyond the control of the peace opera-
tion in question.  
How does the academic literature define success? What are 
some challenges?  
Scholars have generally approached the question of success from one 
of two vantage points: case studies, or large datasets on conflicts and 
interventions. Many recent analyses combine the two.4 Both vantage 
points have their advantages and disadvantages. Case studies generate 
                                                          
3  NATO Allied Joint Publication, 3.4.1. Peace Support Operations, July 2001, available 
at https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-PeaceSupport.pdf.  
4  Lise Morjé Howard (2008) UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Virginia Page Fortna (2008) Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping 
Belligerents' Choices after Civil War, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
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specific in-depth knowledge about particular contexts. They do not 
smooth out the differences between operations. However, they often 
have little to say about the ‘substance’ of success that could be trans-
lated across cases – something that is needed for a robust definition. 
What complicates such analyses of success is the broad empirical bias 
towards both the unsuccessful elements of missions and operations 
deemed unsuccessful in their entirety.5  
In the academic literature, most discussion about the definition of 
success has therefore occurred in connection with quantitative re-
search. Unlike individual case studies, such work has attempted to find 
out whether peace operations as an instrument of third-party interven-
tion are successful. These studies usually begin by providing a yard-
stick for success. However, most quantitative studies define success as 
‘sustainable peace’, ‘durable peace’ or ‘absence of war’ – which is of 
less operational utility for diverse case studies. 
Among scholars there is no agreed definition of success. As noted by 
Thomas G. Weiss, what makes it difficult to gauge success is ‘the ambi-
guity of success and failure, as well as the time frame used to measure 
the durability of results’.6 Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman are fairly 
detailed in their enumeration of the challenges involved in evaluating 
peace operations, seeing these as including (but not limited to) ‘the 
distinction between performance or process and outcomes, multiple 
goals and stakeholders, developing effectiveness metrics, the distinc-
tion between problem-solving, legal, economic, and political ap-
proaches to the meaning of effectiveness, and differences between 
short and long-term evaluations’.7  
Despite these challenges, many scholars have attempted to provide 
definitions and criteria for the success of peace operations. These have 
ranged from minimalist standards, focusing on mandate implementa-
tion, to maximalist ones. The most influential discussions on peace-
keeping success in scholarly debates have tended to employ some ver-
sion of maximalist standards, looking into the macro-question of 
whether international interventions improve the chances of peace.8  
                                                          
5  Lise Morjé Howard (2008), 2. 
6  Thomas G. Weiss (1995) The United Nations and Civil Wars, in Thomas G. Weiss 
(ed.), The United Nations and Civil Wars, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 197. 
7  Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman (2015) Evaluating Peace Operations, in Joachim 
A. Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen and Paul D. Williams (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
8  See for example Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rotschild (2001) 
Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables, Inter-
national Organization 55(1), 183–208; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis 
(2006) Making War and Building Peace, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 
Jair van der Lijn (2006) Walking the Tightrope: Do UN Peacekeeping Operations Ac-
tually Contribute to Durable Peace. Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers; Virginia 
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For example, Virginia Page Fortna judges the success of UN peacekeep-
ing in terms of whether the presence of peace operations reduces the 
risk of another war. Asking whether peace lasts longer when peace-
keepers deploy than when they are absent, she examines the causal 
mechanisms through which their presence may make peace more sta-
ble – durable peace as a benchmark.9 Similarly, Kari M. Osland uses 
positive change towards a defined end-goal as a way of measuring suc-
cess.10 To bring the idea of success closer to a view of the policy com-
munity, Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that the best 
standard is what they call ‘participatory peace’: a situation that in-
volves an end to the war, the absence of significant residual violence, 
undivided sovereignty, and a minimum level of political openness.11 
While different scholars may express a preference for one or the other, 
there are no easy answers to how minimalist or comprehensive meas-
urements of success should be.12 A particularly contentious issue is to 
what extent the external environment outside the direct influence of 
peace operations should be incorporated in measuring success.  
Among the earliest and most often cited attempts at providing com-
prehensive and generalizable criteria are Paul Diehl’s two measures of 
success – limitation of armed conflict, and resolution of an underlying 
conflict – which served as the basis for a set of indicators.13 This sec-
ond criterion has been criticized in subsequent analyses, including 
case studies, because the nature of an underlying conflict may well 
change over time, especially since the factors that ignite wars are not 
the same as those that serve to perpetuate the conflict. In addition, 
Diehl developed his measures of success for a test of six cases of UN 
peacekeeping during the Cold War, raising questions over whether 
such criteria are applicable and useful to assess the multidimensional 
peace operations that have emerged since then.  
                                                          
Page Fortna (2008); Nicholas Sambanis (2008) Short-Term and Long-Term Effects of 
United Nations Peace Operations, World Bank Economic Review 22, 9–32; Anke 
Hoeffler (2014) Can International Interventions Secure the Peace? Area Studies Re-
view 17(1), 75–94. 
 9  Virginia Page Fortna (2008), Chapter 5. 
10  Kari Margrethe Osland (2014) Much Ado About Nothing? The Impact of International 
Assistance to Police Reform in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Ser-
bia and South Sudan. A Comparative Case Study and Developing a Model for Evalu-
ating Democratic Policing. Oslo: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Os-
lo/Akademika Publishing.  
11  Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2006) Making War and Building Peace. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
12  Fen Osler Hampson (1996) Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or 
Fail. Washington, DC: USIP Press, 9.  
13  Paul F. Diehl (1994) International Peacekeeping. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Uni-
versity Press.  
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In his review of Diehl’s book, Robert C. Johansen argued that suc-
cess should not be measured against ‘an ideal state of peace (for exam-
ple, no armed conflict after deployment) or against an ideal form of 
conflict resolution (for example, settlement of long-standing animosi-
ties)’. He considered such measures to be ‘normatively unfair and sci-
entifically unproductive’. To evaluate the utility of peacekeeping, 
scholars should instead ‘(1) assess the effect of peacekeeping forces on 
local people affected by their work, and (2) compare the degree of mis-
understanding, tension, or violence in the presence of UN peacekeep-
ers to the estimated results of balance-of-power activity without peace-
keeping.’14 However, such counterfactual analyses are not only diffi-
cult to conduct – they also give rise to a new set of methodological is-
sues, a point to which I return in the concluding section of this paper. 
Another early attempt at providing generalizable criteria for success 
that more clearly incorporated differences between missions was de-
veloped by Marjorie Ann Brown. She posits three criteria: Was the 
mandate fulfilled, as specified by the appropriate Security Council reso-
lution? Did the operation lead to resolution of the underlying disputes 
of the conflict? and Did the presence of the operation contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security by reducing or elimi-
nating conflict in the area of the operation?15 If Diehl was more sys-
tematic and detailed in developing the indicators for measuring the last 
two, Brown was clearer on the importance of different mandates.  
Duane Bratt16 sought to adapt these evaluation criteria further to the 
realities of post-Cold War peace operations. He used three of the criteria 
employed by Diehl and Brown – mandate performance, facilitating 
conflict resolution, and containing the conflict – to assess 39 UN 
peacekeeping operations. Importantly, he altered and adapted some of 
the indicators developed by Diehl. For example, the indicator ‘combat-
ant deaths’ was replaced by a more encompassing assessment that also 
included civilian deaths, as well as indirect ‘natural’ deaths that could 
have been prevented had humanitarian aid shipments not been 
blocked because of the fighting. Given the prevalence of civilian casual-
ties in intra-state conflicts, such modifications are necessary to reflect 
the evolving raison d’être of peace operations. Moreover, Bratt’s ap-
proach to the modification of earlier indicators offers lessons for how to 
utilize ‘older criteria’ and adapt them to new types of missions.     
                                                          
14  Robert C. Johansen (1994) U.N. Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success? 
Review of International Peacekeeping by Paul F. Diehl, Mershon International Stud-
ies Review 38(1), 309–310.  
15  Marjorie Ann Brown (1993) United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and 
Current Issues. Report for Congress, Washington DC: Congressional Research Ser-
vice.  
16  Duanne Bratt (1996) Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations, Inter-
national Peacekeeping 3(4), 64–81.  
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In contrast to Diehl, both Brown and Bratt included mandates in 
their criteria of success. They deemed such inclusion important, in view 
of the increasing variety of peace operations in the post-Cold War era. 
However, there are at least two challenges involved in the singular use 
of mandate performance. First, mandates are often vague, and ‘there is 
much room for debate on the scope and detail of the operation's mis-
sions’.17 Objectives encompassed in them, such as rule of law, reconcil-
iation or good governance, are subjective notions with competing defi-
nitions. Second, the mandates given to peace operations are often un-
realistic. Operations are given a laundry list of tasks and objectives to 
achieve, stemming from political considerations in the mandating 
body, for example the UN Security Council. There are often no reasona-
ble expectations within the mandating body or the operation leader-
ship that the mission would ever achieve these objectives. It is thus 
practically unfair and theoretically unproductive to judge them solely 
according to these criteria. When looking at mandates as a benchmark, 
subjective decisions on what to include and what to exclude need to be 
made.   
While these early discussions on criteria remain a kind of a gold 
standard in scholarly discussions of success, new, more expansive, 
criteria developed as peace operations started including peacebuilding 
and statebuilding elements in their mandates. Roland Paris calls for a 
very high standard of success by arguing for a criterion of ‘stable and 
lasting peace’ supported by market democracy.18 Similarly, Elizabeth 
Cousens, while warning about holding international efforts to an im-
possibly high standard, develops three goals and benchmarks for suc-
cess: self-enforcing ceasefire; self-enforcing peace; and democracy, 
justice and equity.19 Stephen Stedman and George Downs have pro-
posed slightly more minimalist measures for operationalizing mission 
success, involving scores on two variables: whether large-scale vio-
lence is brought to an end while the implementers are present; and 
whether the war is terminated on a self-enforcing basis so that the im-
plementers can go home without fear of the war breaking out again.20  
There is also another important distinction between the approach of 
Diehl and Bratt and these more recent definitions of success. Diehl and 
Bratt rely on a set of indicators which need to be combined on a scale in 
order to assess the degree of success. While the criteria are increasingly 
more refined, how to combine them depends on a subjective decision. 
                                                          
17  Paul F. Diehl (2008) Peace Operations. Cambridge: Polity, 123.  
18  Roland Paris (2004) At War’s End. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 59. 
19  Elizabeth M. Cousens (2001) Introduction, in Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan 
Kumar with Karin Wermester (eds) Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in 
Fragile Societies. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 11. 
20  Stephen Stedman and George Downs (2001) Evaluation Issues in Peace Implemen-
tation, in Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar with Karin Wermester (eds) 
Peacebuilding as Politics, 50.  
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Are all indicators equally important, or should we be weighing them 
with regard to importance? As individual researchers might decide dif-
ferently on these issues, measurements of success can differ. Stedman 
and Downs thus argue for a more limited number of general 
measures.21 However, these can entail their own problems of subjective 
assessment. 
Some analyses have tried to resolve the complex challenge of having 
to choose between quantifying measures or qualitatively describing the 
level of success by combining the two. This can be done one of two 
ways. The first can be seen in how Darya Pushkina approaches her four 
criteria of success. While all of them have sub-questions (indicators), 
she provides an overall assessment only for each criterion, not for the 
indicators. Her criteria for success of peace operations are as follows: 
limiting violent conflict in the host state; reduction of human suffering; 
prevention of violent conflict beyond the object state’s borders; and 
promotion of conflict resolution.22 In contrast, Lise Morjé Howard’s two 
criteria: mandate implementation; and a broader assessment of the 
state of the country after completion of the UN intervention, are treated 
differently. She breaks down the first criterion along the various tasks 
that were assigned to the mission (indicators), while the second pro-
vides for a qualitative overall assessment.23 Both of these studies indi-
cate that a combination of a macro- and micro-level analysis is the pre-
ferred approach of scholars at the moment. This way analysts capture 
both the variation of missions and the overall goals of peace operations 
at the same time.  
Choices that need to be made 
As seen in the previous section, scholars have not come up with one 
definition or one set of indicators for success of peace operations. Much 
contention remains. Any researcher embarking on an evaluation study 
must make several analytical decisions as to how to operationalize suc-
cess. This section summarizes four such decisions as outlined by Diehl 
and Druckman and offers a brief discussion of how the academic litera-
ture has approached these choices.24  
Stakeholders in peace operations 
In defining success, we must always ask ‘success for whom?’ What 
matters in the operationalization of success will depend on the ad-
dressees, and on the purpose of the analysis. Different actors have dif-
ferent goals or assign different priorities to shared goals. Such differen-
                                                          
21  Ibid., 48.  
22  Darya Pushkina (2006) A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peace-
keeping Mission, International Peacekeeping 13(2), 133–149. 
23  See Lise Morjé Howard (2008), 7–8. 
24  Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman (2015). 
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tiation is evident also within the mission, where the military and the 
civilian part may differ in their priorities. To a large extent, these goals 
can determine the choice of indicators of success. The more specific the 
indicators, the more clearly can we see for whom the study is conduct-
ed. Stakeholders might share some interests (for example, limiting vio-
lence), but these interests will not always be entirely coterminous. 
Troop-contributing countries or the mission as a whole might measure 
their success in terms of the goal of limiting casualties to their own per-
sonnel. However, achieving that version of success could lead these 
troops and mission as a whole to undermine their task of protecting 
civilians. As Diehl and Druckman point out, often left out of calcula-
tions are the interests of the weak: the local population in the area of 
conflict. It is for this reason that most scholars focus their criteria for 
success on macro-level concerns. The benchmarks used in scholarly 
analyses tend to promote the goals of the abstract international com-
munity (such as stability, limitation and resolution of armed conflict) 
and humanity (like human security, reduction of human suffering, jus-
tice).  
Time perspective  
When evaluating peace operations, the researcher needs to decide at 
what point to make an assessment and what time period to assess. 
While short-term and long-term success may be connected, meeting 
short-term goals does not necessarily lead to a positive impact over a 
longer period. As noted above, practitioners tend to focus on short-term 
perspectives, such as the achievement of objectives during the course 
of the operation or immediately after mission withdrawal. Such as-
sessments are needed for modifying policies, adapting strategies and 
planning exits. However, several problems arise with short-term as-
sessments: such evaluations can become quickly outdated; short-term 
trends are often misleading; and, perhaps most importantly, the very 
presence of the operation can distort local relations to the degree where 
it is impossible to assess whether its interventions are self-sustainable.  
Employing a longer-term perspective can ameliorate some of these 
problems. Most academic scholarship has therefore adopted a slightly 
longer-term perspective, looking at the situation in the country a few 
years after the operation has left (or after it started), with the most so-
phisticated analyses adopting duration models. Such analyses do not 
have a cut-off time, but measure the length of time that the peace 
lasts.25 However, such studies also have their drawbacks. The most 
difficult methodological problem is to what extent the intervening forc-
es can be excluded from such studies. The longer the period, the more 
likely will it be that external factors – such as regime change, natural 
disaster or global economic downturn – could have a larger effect on 
local conditions than the legacy of a peace operation. Moreover, such 
                                                          
25  See for example Virginia Page Fortna (2008). 
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longer-term evaluations are not immediately useful for policy and 
planning of ongoing and intended operations.   
Baseline for assessment  
Against what should the success of an operation success be judged? 
That is another dilemma that needs to be settled before commencing a 
research study. As noted above, judging peace operation success 
against some kind of ideal state of peace is unproductive. Some re-
searchers therefore propose conducting counterfactual analysis, where 
achievements and failures of a peace operation are compared against a 
hypothetical situation where no action is taken by the international 
community. However, such analyses are not only difficult: they also 
create an extremely low threshold for peace operations to be labelled 
‘successful’. As noted by Diehl and Druckman, even a marginal im-
provement of the situation could be defined as success. More im-
portantly, such analyses ignore the fact that the international commu-
nity rarely choses between a peace operation and inaction. The reper-
toire of alternative instruments available will range from sanctions and 
enforcement action to diplomatic endeavours and good offices. There 
might also be several different actors able to deploy a peace operation. 
Scenario-based analyses that include probable alternatives are difficult 
to conduct, but offer a good way of assessing the success of peace op-
erations. Another possible baseline is to compare the ‘before’ and ‘af-
ter’ state of affairs. Here, however, we must bear in mind that the out-
come of such an analysis depends greatly on whether an operation is 
deployed during a conflict or after a ceasefire. What the operation is 
compared to becomes crucial.  
Some researchers have abandoned the search for an absolute meas-
ure of success altogether, opting instead to assess relative success 
across peace operations. Such analyses do not seek to produce absolute 
measures of success and thus circumvent some of the methodological 
issues indicated above. They do, however, highlight the importance of 
the last decision: that on what to include in the ‘population of peace 
operations’.   
Types of peace operations  
Comparative analyses are best conducted between like and like. With 
an increasing heterogeneity of peace operations, finding such missions 
has become increasingly difficult. To differentiate between missions, 
most recent analyses include mission mandate as a guideline in deter-
mining success. However, blindly following the mandate as a bench-
mark for success is highly problematic. The analyst should step back 
and identify the primary goals of an operation. While mandates might 
differ between missions, the primary goals are more general. For exam-
ple, in her analysis Page Fortna groups missions under consent-based 
and peace enforcement categories.26 On the other hand, Sambanis dif-
                                                          
26  Ibid.  
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ferentiates between ‘facilitative missions, which provide monitoring 
and reporting (observer and traditional peacekeeping operations), and 
transformational UN missions (multidimensional, enforcement, and 
transitional administration)’.27  
Such goals also tend to coincide with the goals of the wider interna-
tional community and humanity. When scholars have chosen to focus 
exclusively on primary goals they have judged success on these macro-
level concerns. Others, however, have also looked at the more specific 
objectives of the mandate and based on them provided multiple ques-
tions/indicators. The first approach, with the focus on primary goals 
and macro-level concerns, enables greater comparability, whereas the 
second approach provides for more detailed, mission-specific analyses.  
 
                                                          
27  Nicholas Sambanis (2008), 14.  
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